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Corruption and its challenges: the battle to stop a 
universal problem
Low compliance with the law imposes burdens on judicial systems
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Corruption is increasingly seen as a universal 
problem, deeply embedded in many national 
legal systems, and also transnational in 
nature. It is so endemic that it has generated 
its own special vernacular, such as “Code 
1,000” in Honduras (a reference to the 1,000 
lempira note), “mordida” in Mexico, 
“arreglo” in the Philippines, “baksheesh” in 
Egypt, “dash” in Kenya, or “pot de vin” in 
France. Classical Islamic law textbooks for 
judges are emphatic about avoiding “rashwa.”
Increasingly, varied constituencies recognize 
the serious consequences of corruption on 
class stratification, poverty, commerce, 
economic development, democracy, equality, 
health care, education, the environment, other 
public services, women, indigenous peoples, and cultural identity. Development 
organizations find that shockingly large portions of loans or grants never reach their 
intended beneficiaries. Economists have observed (when compared to high taxation) 
greater negative impacts of corruption on growth. Investors do not have confidence in 
corrupt legal systems.
Corruption also deteriorates trust in democratic institutions. It advantages the 
powerful over the weak, and creates resentment between the “haves” and “have nots.” 
Gaining access to health care or good schools is frequently conditioned on making 
additional payments. If polluters can buy their way out of environmental controls, the 
ecology of clean air. Anti-drug enforcement, as another example, is riddled with 
corruption.
The requirement of an illicit payment to facilitate the provision by an official of birth 
or death certificates increases the cost and blocks access to basic services. Corrupt 
practices are often falsely and harmfully internalized as a cultural attribute of the 
country in which they have flourished. Officials who practice corruption are 
themselves demoralized.
Beyond these more general effects, corruption undermines the very institutions, 
including the judicial and legal system which are responsible for enforcing anti-
corruption norms. In those countries where corruption is profoundly institutionalized, 
litigants with meritorious claims or defenses cannot rely on the judicial process to 
produce a correct and effective result and have a higher incentive for employing 
extra-legal means to win cases. Instead of hiring a better lawyer to obtain a 
meritorious result, litigants have a strong incentive to retain a less ethical one merely 
as an intermediary for illicit payments to judges.
The ease with which the law is undermined weakens the incentives for compliance. 
Low compliance with the law in turn imposes an additional burden on the judicial 
system to resolve greater numbers of conflicts arising from violations of public and 
private rights and obligations.
This produces a vicious cycle of low compliance, more disputes, corrupt practices, 
and inconsistent, if not illegal, outcomes, which in turn reduces further the incentives 
to comply with the law. The seemingly interactive nature of corruption and low levels 
of development raise the prospect of a vicious cycle, thus making it difficult to 
understand precisely how the effects of corruption – under- or mal-development –
may simultaneously contribute to corruption.
The institutional response to corruption is now nearly as pervasive as the linguistic 
usage around the world. NGOs like Transparency International, founded in 1993, 
have increasingly drawn attention to the problem. Development banks (such as the 
World Bank and Regional Development Banks), aid agencies (USAID), and other 
international institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations and 
its affiliated groups and units) have for many years conditioned aid to developing 
countries on their commitment to anti-corruption reforms. These national and 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations simultaneously 
provide technical assistance to those countries in search of help.
On a normative level, national, transnational, regional, and international law prohibits 
corruption and requires that countries take affirmative steps to prevent and prosecute 
it. Chapter II, Article 5, Paragraph 3 of the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption provides that “Each State Party shall endeavor to establish and promote 
effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.” Many national 
governments have enacted new domestic laws that increasingly reach extraterritorial 
conduct, (e.g., the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and multilateral treaties (e.g., 
OECD) that seek to restrain actors from arbitraging more permissive national laws 
and enforcement capacities in weaker regimes within the global economy. This flood 
of national, transnational, and international legislative activity is worldwide in its 
ambition for a comprehensive approach to combat corrupt practices in various 
branches and agencies of government, including customs, tax, and other regulatory 
and licensing authorities.
Overall, however, the positive effects of these anti-corruption interventions are 
difficult to observe. Why? In subsequent essays in this series, I will describe in further 
detail five primary reasons. First, we are still unclear about conceptions and 
definitions of the precise behavior we wish to curtail. Second, we struggle to measure 
levels of corruption with sufficient empirical accuracy. Third, we have not grasped 
and reconciled the three competing theories (political, economic, and ethical) of what 
produces corruption. Fourth, we have not appreciated the underlying weak 
foundations for legal reforms to work effectively. And finally, our approaches to 
reform have not developed or applied new theories individual or institutional 
behavior. Before we complete this outstanding global homework, we will have little 
hope of tacking the very troubling problem of corruption in our societies.
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